“. . . if someone makes a mistake in treating the sick, do you call him a doctor by virtue of the actual mistake? . . . No, I think that’s just the form of words we use. . . . no one who exercises a skill ever makes a mistake. People who makes mistakes make them because their knowledge fails them, at which point they are not exercising their skill.” —Thrasymachus, I.340d-e (18)
Thrasymachus argues that justice is whatever is good for the stronger. He opens his arguments by explaining it as a game: We’re just pawns who must do whatever to help the stronger. Socrates disproves this postulation by proving that the strong sometimes make mistakes about what is good for them, that the strong get the weak to do what is bad for them, and that the just (doing what the strong want) are unjust (because it is bad for the strong)—a contradiction and, thus, a defeat. The above argument is Thrasymachus’s attempt to exonerate himself from this defeat. This works, until Socrates defeats this, by claiming that the strong, insofar as they are acting as the strong, cannot make a mistake about what is beneficial for them. This allows Socrates to shift the definition of justice to the exact opposite of Thrasymachus’s original definition and, ultimately, defeat Thrasymachus again.
Thrasymachus’s argument is quite clever and uses semantics against Socrates, distinguishing between precise and common word usage. This prompts Socrates’s argument about the pure roles of people. A doctor, for example, isn’t just a healer of the sick, but also a businessman. But, as long as the doctor is acting within his role, and not outside of it, he cannot make a mistake. Because, when we look at people who are acting purely in their roles, the knowledge implicit with their role will prevent any mistakes; it is only when they step out of this role, and, thus, out of the knowledge of that role, that they are vulnerable to mistakes. It’s important to note that Thrasymachus is right here: We don’t call someone a doctor because they made a mistake in practicing. They’re a doctor because they’ve been to medical school and have knowledge of human physiology and the methods of healing. We just happen to call this person a doctor when referring to this mistake. It’s an inadequacy in language—he’s right about this. This, ironically, helps Socrates eventually invert Thrasymachus’s definition using the strong definition from earlier. Because insofar as the ruler—i.e., the strong—is ruling, he isn’t prescribing that which is good for himself; instead, he is looking to do what is expedient for his constituents—the objects of his trade. Therefore, justice can’t be what is good for the stronger; it must be what is good for the weaker.
Editorial Note: This was actually an assignment for the aforementioned Ethics class. It’s a 2000 level class, but my first philosophy class. He spent much time talking about how everyone was going to do poorly because it’s their first philosophy paper. I’m proud to say that I got an A.
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